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Abstract 
 
We  assess  the  extent  to  which  capital  buffers  (the  capital  banks  hold  in 
excess  of  the  regulatory  minimum)  exacerbate  rather  than  reduce  the 
cyclical behavior of credit. We empirically study the relationships between 
output gap, capital buffers and loan growth with firm-level data for French 
banks over the period 1993—2009. Our findings reveal that bank capital 
buffers intensify the cyclical credit fluctuations arising from the output gap 
developments, all the more as better quality capital is considered. Moreover, 
by performing Granger causality tests at the bank level, we find evidence of 
a two-way causality between capital buffers and loan growth, pointing to 
mutually  reinforcing  mechanisms.  Overall,  those  empirical  results  lend 
support  to  a  countercyclical  financial  regulation  that  focuses  on  highest-
quality capital and aims at smoothing loan growth. 
 
Keywords:  Bank  Capital  Regulation,  Procyclicality,  Capital  Buffers, 
Business Cycle Fluctuations, Basel III 






Nous évaluons dans quelle mesure les coussins en capital (le capital que les 
banques détiennent au-dessus du minimum réglementaire) amplifient plutôt 
que  réduisent  le  comportement  cyclique  du  crédit.  Nous  étudions 
empiriquement les relations entre la croissance économique, les coussins en 
capital et la distribution de crédit à partir de données individuelles sur les 
banques  françaises  au  cours  de  la  période  1993—2009.  Nos  résultats 
montrent que le capital bancaire amplifie les fluctuations du crédit résultant  
du cycle économique, et ce d’autant plus que le capital considéré est de 
meilleure  qualité.  Par  ailleurs,  en  conduisant  des  tests  de  causalité  de 
Granger au niveau de chaque banque, nous mettons en évidence une double 
causalité entre coussins en capital et croissance du crédit, ce qui met en 
évidence des mécanismes se renforçant mutuellement. Dans l’ensemble, ces 
résultats  empiriques  plaident  pour  une  réglementation  financière  contra-
cyclique qui se fonde sur le capital de meilleure qualité et qui tend à lisser la 
croissance du crédit. 
 
Mots clés : Réglementation du capital bancaire, Procyclicité, Coussins en 
capital, Fluctuations économiques, Bâle 3  
JEL codes: G28, G21 3 
 
1.  Introduction 
A puzzling fact about the global financial crisis that broke out in the early 
Summer 2007 is the disproportion between the restrained losses from actual 
defaults of US subprime borrowers, on the one hand, and the huge write-
offs reported by financial institutions as well as the large-scale real effects 
on the world economy, on the other hand. This sharp discrepancy constitutes 
a clear exemplification of financial intermediation being an inherently pro-
cyclical  activity.  As  explained  by  Borio  et  al.  (2001)  and  Lowe  (2002), 
during economic expansions, financial institutions are more willing to take 
risks,  credit  markets  are  more  prone  to  competition,  credit  spreads,  risk 
premia and other measures of risk aversion approach low levels and the 
access to credit becomes easier as collateral values are rising. Conversely, in 
recessions,  banks  and  other  financial  institutions  are  weaker,  more 
conservative, and credit declines as net worth and collateral values erode, 
thus exacerbating business cycles. 
In  the  aftermath  of  the  current  financial  crisis,  supervisors  and  public 
authorities have closely monitored the transmission channels through which 
bank distress might spill over to the real economy, worsening the downturn 
and dampening the recovery to come. One of these mechanisms involves the 
lending capacity of banks and the fear of a ‘credit crunch’, in which a sharp 
decrease in bank capital would result in banks squeezing credit distribution 
to maintain their capital ratios, leading to a credit rationing that would harm 
economic growth.  
Undoubtedly,  this  is  the  main  reason  why  capital  injections  by  public 
authorities  were  conditionally  granted,  subject  to  firm  commitments  by 
financial institutions to neither cut dramatically their loan distribution, nor 
tighten too severely their credit conditions. Within the context of imminent 
exit  strategies  –  i.e.  the  fact  that  public  authorities  would  withdraw  the 
capital  they  injected  in  banks’  balance-sheets  during  the  crisis  –  the 
underlying  pro-cyclical  mechanisms  are  gaining  wide  and  renewed 4 
momentum.  Since  the  G20  Washington  Summit  in  November  2008, 
international political and regulatory bodies have focused attention on pro-
cyclicality and policies to mitigate its outsized effects.5 For instance, the 
then Financial Stability Forum (FSF), which became the Financial Stability 
Board subsequently, set up in 2008 three working groups that analyzed the 
various facets of pro-cyclicality (e.g. FSF, 2009). The Basel Committee on 
Banking  Supervision  (BCBS)  has  been  developing  policy  measures  to 
mitigate pro-cyclicality (BIS, 2008; Andritzky et al., 2009). It is also worth 
noting that the so-called “Capital Reform Proposal” launched by the BCBS 
in the mid-December 2009 contains a full package of measures to promote a 
more countercyclical capital adequacy framework, including the build-up of 
capital buffers, as well as incentives to implement forward-looking loan loss 
provisioning based on expected losses (BCBS, 2009). At the international 
level, a broad consensus has been reached that addressing pro-cyclicality is 
a key component of a sound macro-prudential policy. 
In  this  paper,  we  assess  the  two-way  interplays  between  bank  capital 
buffers,  lending  and  economic  growth,  and  examine  the  extent  to  which 
capital  buffers  might  be  considered  as  procyclical.  By  definition,  capital 
buffers denote the excess capital banks hold above the minimum regulatory 
level. In contrast to a cyclical variable, which follows and is mainly driven 
by  the  business  cycle  fluctuations,  a  procyclical  variable  is  supposed  to 
drive  and  magnify  the  fluctuations  of  economic  activity.  The  results 
reported in this paper provide analytical and empirical background to the 
current policy debate on the introduction of countercyclical capital buffers 
in the future “Basel III” package and, more generally, on the procyclical 
impact of the Basel regulatory framework.6 
                                                 
5 See also the Position Paper on a countercyclical capital buffer published by the CEBS in July 2009 (CEBS, 2009). 
6 The Basel Committee’s response to the global financial crisis includes a proposal that requires banks to hold 
(countercyclical) capital buffers above the minimum capital requirements imposed by regulators. According to the 
Committee, such buffers should be built up during economic expansions and drawn down throughout significant 
sector-wide downturns. Interestingly, if capital falls below some pre-specified “buffer ranges” -- but it is still 
above the minimum regulatory level -- the bank would be subject to capital distribution constraints, restrictions on 
dividend payouts or constraints on employee bonus payments. 5 
The present paper contributes to and extends the existing literature on the 
procyclicality of bank capital in at least two important ways.  
First, the paper reports empirical evidence for French banks, based on both 
panel data econometric estimations and Granger causality tests. The focus 
on France is relevant to the procyclicality literature because bank lending is 
by far the prevailing form of external finance in this country. Consequently, 
reductions in lending when bank capital is eroded are likely to have more 
harmful economic effects than in other, market-oriented, financial systems, 
where borrowers may alternatively tap the financial markets or deal with 
other  financial  intermediaries.  Moreover,  the  “procyclical  leverage” 
hypothesis documented by Adrian and Shin (2010) on US data does not 
seem to hold equally for all industrialized countries (Panetta et al., 2009).7 
Particularly, while banks and financial institutions headquartered in the US 
and the UK do exhibit a significant positive correlation between asset prices 
and (marked-to-market) leverage, in France and some other few countries 
the correlation is negative. Consequently, there seems to be considerable 
scope  for  examining  the  procyclicality  of  bank  capital  outside  the  US, 
particularly  in  countries  where  the  relationship  between  changes  in  total 
assets and changes in leverage is reversed.  
Second,  the  paper  reports  empirical  evidence  based  on  both  panel  data 
econometric estimations and Granger causality tests. The primary aim of the 
panel estimations is to assess the build-up of capital buffers throughout the 
cycle and their impact on bank lending behavior. Precisely, we estimate two 
relationships: (i) the empirical effect of economic growth on capital buffers 
and (ii) the impact of capital buffers on loan growth. An important feature 
of the present paper is to look not only at the total capital buffer, but also at 
the buffers composed of higher-quality capital: Tier 1 capital and core Tier 
1  capital.  We  then  investigate  the  Granger-type  causality  between  bank 
capital buffers and loan growth at the bank level. To our knowledge, the 
                                                 
7  Adrian and Shin (2010) lend empirical support to the thesis that banks tend to adjust their capital allocation 
decisions and balance sheets in order to attain some target levels of leverage. Consequently, a negative shock that 
erodes capital may reduce bank lending and exacerbate the procyclicality. 6 
present paper is the first one to use Granger causality tests to investigate the 
two-way interplays between bank capital buffers and credit growth. In our 
view, this approach is relevant because it sheds new light on the main causal 
links behind the procyclicality hypothesis. 
Our main findings reveal that capital buffers and loan growth at the bank 
level depend on the output gap in a pro-cyclical manner. In addition, we put 
forward that bank capital buffers – especially the ones related to the purest 
forms of capital – exacerbate the cyclical developments of credit. Finally, 
we find evidence of Granger-causality running from capital buffers to credit 
growth.  Overall,  the  empirical  results  lend  support  to  a  countercyclical 
financial  regulation  aiming  at  smoothing  credit  growth  and  focused  on 
better-quality capital. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We provide an overview 
of  the  related  literature  in  Section  2.  Section  3  describes  the  data  and 
discusses  some  stylized  facts  resulting  from  simple  descriptive  statistics. 
Section 4 elaborates on the econometric strategy and discusses our main 
results.  Section  5  analyzes  the  causality  between  bank  capital  and  loan 
growth.  Finally,  section  6  concludes  and  discusses  some  policy 
implications. 
 
2.  Banks’  capital  buffers  and  loan  growth:  related 
literature  
The macroeconomic consequences of bank capital requirements have been 
extensively studied since the adoption of the first Basel Capital Accord at 
the beginning of the nineties. The empirical literature on the relationships 
between output, bank capital (buffers), and loan growth, can be classified in 
two broad categories: the first one investigates the determinants of capital 
buffers and their potential procyclical effects; the second one studies the 
role  of  bank  capital  and  other  factors  in  explaining  fluctuations  in  loan 
growth. 7 
 
2.1 Determinants of capital buffers 
The conventional starting point for studying capital structure in banks and 
non-financial firms is the Modigliani and Miller proposition, which states 
that the capital structure does not  affect the value of the firm under the 
standard assumptions of perfect capital markets and no taxes. In the real 
world,  there  are  significant  departures  from  Modigliani  and  Miller’s 
assumptions  due  to  taxes,  asymmetric  information,  agency  costs,  costly 
financial distress and, more importantly in the case of banks, regulations. 
Consequently, targeting ‘optimal’ levels of capital may be value-enhancing.  
More precisely in the case of banks, if the implicit subsidies arising from the 
mispriced financial safety net (barriers to entry, deposit insurance, implicit 
guarantees…) were large enough, banks may choose to hold the minimum 
level of equity capital allowed by their regulators. In that case, one would 
observe little or no cross-sectional heterogeneity in the reported solvency 
ratios,  as  the  capital  adequacy  framework  imposes  uniform  minimum 
standards. Yet, this simplistic view does not hold, as the reported levels of 
capital  are  heterogeneous,  and  generally  higher  than  the  regulatory 
minimum in developed countries. Flannery and Rangan (2008) and Berger 
et al. (2008) provide convincing evidence for the largest US banks, while 
Jokipii and Milne (2008), Gropp and Heider (2010) and Brewer et al. (2008) 
document the levels and cross-sectional variations in the bank capital ratios 
of internationally active banks. 
Why do banks hold so much costly capital over and above the regulatory 
minimum?  What  are  the  main  factors  explaining  the  cross-sectional  and 
time  variation  in  bank  capital  buffers?  The  literature  provides  several 
competing, albeit not mutually exclusive, answers to these questions (Berger 
et al. 1995; Berger et al., 2008; Flannery and Rangan, 2008). First, banks 
may hold excess, “precautionary” , capital in order to avoid adjustment costs 
in raising equity on short notice or supervisory penalties if they approach 
the regulatory minimum. Second, if the regulatory capital only imperfectly 8 
reflects the risk of losing the bank’s charter value, capital buffers act as a 
cushion that protects its going concern value. Third, banks may also prefer 
to  hold  capital  buffers  because  they  fear  being  short  of  funds,  should 
attractive investment opportunities (e.g. profitable acquisitions) arise in the 
future. Finally, banks may maintain higher capital ratios as a response to 
disciplinary pressures exerted by private market forces, to gain access to 
specific OTC markets (e.g. derivatives) or to obtain a targeted credit rating 
from external agencies. 
Although  it  seems  difficult  to  disentangle  these  various  determinants  of 
bank capital buffers empirically, a better understanding of the main factors 
driving the formation of these buffers may help shed light on other relevant 
policy  questions.  One  of  these  questions  is  the  procyclicality  of  capital 
regulations.  Basically,  during  recessions,  the  bank  capital  is  likely  to  be 
eroded by losses on the loan portfolio, as default probabilities increase with 
the worsening of the macroeconomic environment; thus banks have to hold 
more regulatory capital, especially under the Basel II standards. If raising 
new capital is prohibitively expensive because the whole financial system is 
under stress, the most cost-effective way to rebuild capital ratios is to cut 
back on lending, thereby amplifying the initial recessionary shock. If banks 
naturally built up capital buffers during good times, in order to better absorb 
losses  under  stressful  conditions,  the  procyclicality  concerns  would  be 
partially  offset.  If  this  is  not  the  case,  bank  capital  buffers  may  move 
procyclically. Otherwise stated, banks may target higher solvency ratios in 
bad times in anticipation of future uncertainty and losses on their portfolios, 
which would eventually reduce the loan supply further and exacerbate the 
recession. 
The empirical literature has not reached consensus regarding the procyclical 
effects of capital buffers. The common approach used in most papers is to 
assess the impact of the business cycle on the observed capital or capital 
buffers.  In  their  seminal  paper,  Ayuso  et  al.  (2004)  report  a  robust  and 
negative  relationship  between  capital  buffers  and  the  business  cycle  for 
Spanish  commercial  and  savings  banks  over  the  period  1986-2000,  i.e. 9 
under the Basel I regime.8 Some other papers report similar negative co-
movements between capital buffers and the business cycle using data on 
banks  headquartered  in  individual  countries:  Lindquist  (2004)  for 
Norwegian  banks;  Stoltz  and  Wedow  (2010)  for  German  savings  and 
cooperative banks; Alfon et al.  (2004) and Francis and Osborne (2009) for 
UK  banks  and  building  societies.  However,  important  asymmetries  are 
reported  in  these  studies  between  low-and  highly-capitalized  banks, 
commercial and savings banks, small and large banks and building societies 
and commercial banks. 
Other studies examine the same question in a broader, cross-country setting. 
Using  a  large  panel  dataset  on  OECD  commercial  banks,  Bikker  and 
Metzemakers  (2004)  find  a  moderate  relationship  between  the  observed 
equity capital ratios and the business cycle. In addition, the procyclicality 
effect exhibits substantial variations across countries and bank-size classes. 
Jokipii  and  Milne  (2008)  complement  and  extend  these  findings  by 
conducting  a  comprehensive  empirical  analysis  on  the  determinants  of 
capital buffers of European banks. They confirm the negative co-movement 
of  capital  buffers  with  the  cycle  but  with  some  important  caveats. 
Particularly, for banks in EU accession countries, as well as for cooperative 
and  smaller  European  banks,  capital  buffers  move  counter-cyclically. 
Finally,  Fonseca  and  Gonzáles  (2010)  analyze  the  bank-  and  country-
specific  determinants  of  capital  buffers  using  a  larger  panel  of  banking 
organizations  headquartered  in  70  developing  and  developed  countries. 
They confirm the existence of different patterns of capital buffers across 
countries, after controlling for the cost of deposits, market power, and other 
relevant  explanatory  factors.  A  significant  negative  relationship  between 
capital buffers and economic cycle is reported only for seven countries. In 
                                                 
8 One may be tempted to infer that if bank capital buffers move procyclically under the Basel I capital accord, the 
procyclical effects should be a fortiori stronger after the implementation of the more risk-sensitive Basel II capital 
accord. However, such an inference is subject to the usual Lucas critique: it would be imprudent to draw policy 
implications concerning the potential procyclicality of Basel II from the observed cyclical patterns of capital 
buffers  under  Basel  I.  Using  a  dynamic  equilibrium  model  of  relationship  banking  in  which  business  cycle 
fluctuations affect the borrowers’ default probabilities, Repullo and Suarez (2010) show that capital requirements 
under Basel II have an ambiguous effect on capital holdings. In the same vein, Heid (2007) proposes a different 
theoretical model and shows that capital buffers under Basel II may actually move counter-cyclically, because the 
rise in risk weights will more than compensate the reduction in bank lending. 10 
five other countries, the sign of the relationship is reversed, while in the 
remaining 59 countries the cycle variable does not enter significantly in the 
capital buffer regressions. 
 
2.2  The impact of capital buffers on loans and the real economy 
The  empirical  studies  mentioned  above  give  some  evidence  of  capital 
buffers co-varying with the business cycle. However, even if buffers move 
in  a  highly  procyclical  manner,  this  result  is  only  a  necessary,  not  a 
sufficient,  condition  to  observe  significant  procyclicality  in  the  real 
economy. Another important causal link in the procyclicality chain has to be 
confirmed, running from capital buffers to bank lending.  
Another strand of the procyclicality literature, which we briefly review in 
what  follows,  has  examined  the  role  of  bank  capital  in  explaining 
fluctuations in loan growth. 
The  effects  of  capital  requirements  on  banks’  lending  behavior  over  the 
business  cycle  have  long  been  documented,  not  only  because  of  the 
implementation of the risk-sensitive Basel II framework. Indeed, concerns 
about the existence of a so-called “bank capital channel,” whereby changes 
in  banks’  capitalization  influence  the  transmission  of  business  cycle 
fluctuations  on  lending,  have  been  expressed  since  the  observed  credit 
crunches  in  the  late  eighties  and  early  nineties.9,10  The  earlier  literature, 
carefully surveyed by Sharpe (1995) and Jackson et al. (1999), conclude 
that, at least in the short run, negative shocks to capital lead low-capitalized 
banks to cut back on new lending during recessions. 
There are two main conditions for the existence of the bank capital channel. 
First, the market for bank equity is imperfect, that is, banks cannot easily 
                                                 
9 Another important question examined in the bank capital channel literature is to what extent the introduction of the 
Basel I risk-based capital accord at the beginning of the nineties caused or exacerbated the subsequent decline in 
output observed in several developed countries. 
10 Bank capital may also influence the impact of recessionary shocks on loan growth through the “bank lending 
channel,” which is built on imperfections in the market for bank debt. However, as this channel pertains to 
monetary shocks (e.g. tighter reserve requirements on demand deposits) and the monetary policy transmission 
mechanisms, rather than output shocks, we do not discuss here the related literature. 11 
issue new equity to finance profitable lending opportunities due to agency 
costs, information asymmetries, and tax disadvantages (Kashyap and Stein, 
1995).  Second,  banks  are  subject  to  regulatory  capital  requirements  and 
have no excess capital to absorb output shocks. However, bank capital may 
affect lending conditions even when capital requirements are not binding, if 
banks fear the risk of breaching the regulatory minimum in the future or 
want to maintain high credit ratings (Van den Heuvel, 2002). Some papers 
add a third condition: banks bear an interest rate risk due to the maturity 
mismatch  between  their  short-term  liabilities  and  their  long-term  assets 
(Van den Heuvel, 2002; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004). 
Recent papers confirm the relevance of the bank capital channel and show 
that capital buffers do influence the response of lending to output shocks. 
For instance, Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) rely on a set of Italian banks 
representing about 80% of aggregate credit and find that well-capitalized 
banks are in a better position to preserve lending relationship by absorbing 
temporary  difficulties  faced  by  their  borrowers.  Interestingly,  the 
introduction of capital requirements higher than the standard minimum of 
8% for risky banks resulted in a 20% decline of lending after two years. 
Using a large sample of listed banks in 31 countries, Nier and Zicchino 
(2005) estimate standard loan growth equations and confirm that loan losses 
usually lead to a larger decline in credit for banks having smaller capital 
buffers. Finally, Francis and Osborne (2009) examine whether a change in 
individual  capital  requirements  imposed  on  a  sample  of  UK  banks 
influences banks’ internal capital targets and, in turn, the lending supply. 
They carry out two-step estimations, first identifying the determinants of 
bank capital ratios and then estimating a model of lending growth. They find 
a  positive  relationship  between  capital  requirements  and  banks’  targeted 
capital ratios and between lending growth and excess capital (defined with 
respect  to  the  unobserved  target  capital  ratio).  Their  results  suggest  that 
lending  growth  is  less  constrained  for  banks  which  hold  surplus  capital 
relative to the internal target. They also simulate the impact of a counter-
cyclical measure consisting in raising gradually capital requirements by 3% 12 
over the period 2000--2003; this would have dampened loan growth by 20% 
over the period 2000--2007, when the credit boom fuelled in the UK. In a 
recent related contribution, Berrospide and Edge (2010) find a significant 
and positive relationship between lending and capital ratio at the individual 
level (better capitalized banks grant more credit), whatever the measure of 
capital  ratio  used.  However,  they  infer  substantially  small  effects  in 
magnitude of capital-to-asset ratios on lending after estimating both panel 
regressions  for  a  sample  of  large  US  banks  and  a  vector  autoregressive 
(VAR) model. They attribute this result to the fact that US banks were better 
capitalized and closer to their target capital ratios in 2008 than they were 
just before the credit crunch of the early nineties. 
The  literature  has  mainly  focused  on  the  procyclical  effects  of  capital 
buffers by assuming a significant decline in economic activity caused by a 
reduction of the credit supply. Fonseca, Gonzáles, and Da Silva (2010) take 
a  different  approach  by  analyzing  and  testing  the  potential  expansionary 
effect of capital buffers through a reduction in interest rate spreads. They 
find  that  well-capitalized  banks  charge  lower  interest  spreads  to  their 
borrowers and also pay lower, but safer, interest rate spreads to depositors. 
Capital buffers appear to have stronger influence on the economic activity 
through  these  price  channels  in  developing  countries  during  downturns, 
partially offsetting the procyclical effect.  
 
3.  The dataset 
3.1 Description of the data 
To  construct  our  sample  of  banks,  we  rely  on  a  confidential  database 
provided by the French Prudential Supervisory Authority (PSA). We start 
from  an  unbalanced  panel  dataset  covering  231  French  banks  on  a 
consolidated basis over the period 1993-2009, on a yearly frequency. We 
prefer to use consolidated rather than solo (unconsolidated) data in order to 
make the prudential data, especially the capital buffers figures, as relevant 13 
as possible. More exactly, we decide not to make use of the quarterly Basel 
II – compliant data, because they would not give us long enough time series. 
Indeed, the quarterly reports are available for French banks only after 2007. 
As we are interested in banks with significantly long time series, and in 
order  to  be  consistent  with  the  selection  rule  applied  in  the  subsequent 
Granger causality tests, we restrict our sample to those banks for which we 
record  at  least  eight  consecutive  observations  for  our  two  dependent 
variables: capital buffer and loan growth. In addition, as we are interested in 
the behavior of banks for which granting loans is one of the main activities, 
we exclude the banks whose loan stock is below 100 million euros, which is 
a low threshold and thus not too restrictive. Moreover,  we remove bank 
holding  companies  for  credit  cooperatives  and  mutual  banks  in  order  to 
avoid double counting of loans outstanding, which could stem from the fact 
that regional credit cooperatives report their prudential and balance sheet 
data  to  the  supervisor  on  a  “sub-consolidated”  basis.  After  cleaning  the 
initial dataset, we end up with 98 banks that represent about 70% of the total 
bank loan outstanding in 2009, which makes our final dataset representative 
of the French banking system. 
Particular attention is paid to the treatment of bank mergers, which may 
otherwise distort loan growth. To that end, we use a Prudential Supervisory 
Authority  internal  database  listing  mergers  involving  French  credit 
institutions from 1993 onwards. For each merger, we build a fictitious bank 
the  year  preceding  the  merger  by  summing  the  loan  outstanding  of  the 
merging parties. This then allows us to compute a loan growth net of the 
effect of the merger for the year of this event. In some few cases, we do not 
have any information on the absorbed entities. This is exclusively the case 
when the latter are very small banks. In that case, we interpolate the loan 
growth between the year preceding and the year following the merger. We 
finally end up with 1,305 bank-year observations. 14 
As  far  as  the  aggregated  series  are  concerned,  output  gaps  are  extracted 
from the OECD database and are calculated by using a production function 
approach  to  derive  estimates  of  potential  output11.  The  main  refinancing 
rates are taken from the Banque de France for the 1993-1998 period and 
from the European Central Bank databases for the 1999-2009 period. 
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics  
The 98 French credit institutions included in our dataset can be split into 
three categories according to their legal status: (i) 21 commercial banks; (ii) 
61  mutual,  savings  banks  and  credit  cooperatives;  (iii)  16  financial  and 
investment firms. Table 1a displays some descriptive statistics for all banks 
and  by  decomposing  the  sample  into  these  three  categories.  The  median 
capital buffer for the whole French banking system amounts to a high value, 
namely 46% of the regulatory minimum. This figure suggests that most of 
the time the regulatory constraint is not binding. The buffers are especially 
high for the financial and investment firms (92.7%). Concerning Tier 1 and 
core Tier 1 capital buffers, their median largely overcome the regulatory 
minimums  (238%  and  456%  respectively  for  the  whole  sample).  Mutual 
savings  banks  and  credit  cooperatives  display  a  very  high  level  of 
capitalization  for  these  highest  quality  forms  of  capital  (median  figures 
reaching 270% for Tier 1 and 523% for core Tier 1), in line with the stylized 
facts reported in the literature (Stoltz and Wedow, 2010; Jokipii and Milne, 
2008). This finding may stem from the fact that this kind of banks may have 
a  lower  access  than  commercial  banks  to  debt  instruments  included  in 
overall capital, such as hybrid securities. Another interesting feature is the 
high  degree  of  cross-sectional  heterogeneity  of  these  levels  of  buffer,  as 
reflected by relatively high standard deviations. 
                                                 
11 Potential output is determined as the level of output that results when all factors of production and total factor 
productivity are at their potential levels. The output gap is then defined as the difference between actual and 
potential output, expressed as a share of potential output. 15 
Graph 1 enables us to observe the fluctuations of the buffers. It suggests that 
banks do not target a fixed buffer as the evolution of their level of capital is 
not  correlated  with  the  evolution  of  their  risk-weighted  assets  (RWA). 
Another  interpretation  is  that  changes  in  the  level  of  capital  buffers  are 
driven both by changes in the level of total capital and in RWAs. 
 
[Table 1a and Graph 1: Descriptive statistics on main bank variables] 
 
Graph 2 illustrates the evolution of the output gap, credit growth and the 
average  capital  buffer  for  the  whole  banking  system.  It  suggests  the 
existence of cyclical patterns in the evolution of banks’ capital buffers and 
credit growth. The picture is somewhat mixed as the sign of the relationship 
between those three variables seems to differ depending on the period. At 
first  glance,  there  seems  to  be  a  break  in  2000,  when  the  relationship 
between the average weighted capital buffer on the one hand, output gap 
and  loan  growth  on  the  other  hand,  turns  to  be  negative.  Hence,  our 
econometric  investigation  will  allow  for  an  alternative  specification 
estimated on the period prior to 2000. 
 
[Graph 2: Output gap, capital buffers and bank loan growth] 
 
Table  1b  provides  the  correlation  coefficients  between  the  means  of  the 
variables in our model. We find a slightly negative correlation between the 
capital buffer and the output gap (-0.02) i.e. a decrease in the output gap 
would be coincident to a rise in capital buffer, consistent with the intuition 
of a precautionary behavior by banks. As expected, loan growth and output 
gap  are  positively  correlated  (0.05).  Interestingly,  there  is  a  negative 
correlation between the total capital buffers and the loan growth (-0.06); this 
result is stronger for Tier 1 or core Tier 1 capital buffers, the correlation 
coefficients being -0.12 and -0.22, respectively These negative correlations 16 
are consistent with the idea that a decreasing output gap would be associated 
with more capital buffers that would in turn slow down loan growth.   
[Table 1b: Correlation coefficients between the means of the variables] 
 
4.  Model and results 
Our purpose is to understand whether bank capital buffers exacerbate the 
cyclical  behaviour  of  loans  that  is  to  say  whether  bank  capital  is  a 
transmission channel from output gap fluctuations to credit developments 
that behaves pro-cyclically. Hence, we estimate two equations: the first one 
seeks  to  assess  whether  the  output  gap  is  a  determinant  of  the  capital 
buffers; the second aims at understanding the effect of capital buffer on the 
loan growth controlling for the output gap. Should a decrease in the output 
gap lead in fine to a decrease in loan growth through capital buffers, then the 
procyclical effect of the latter would be demonstrated. This is the hypothesis 
we are testing in this Section.  
 
4.1  Banks’ capital buffers equation 
In a first step, we estimate a relationship between banks’ capital buffer and a 
set of explanatory variables. The model is expressed as follows: 
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=100  is bank i’s capital buffer at time t, expressed as the  
relative  gap  between  the  actual  amount  of  bank  capital  it K   and  the 
regulatory  minimum  capital  requirement 
R
it K ;  0 a   is  the  intercept;  m a  
m=1,…M,  denote  the  M  coefficients  common  to  all  banks  on  the 
explanatory  variables,  Xm,i,t;  t i, e ,  the  residuals  of  the  equation  assumed 
independent and identically distributed. 17 
As we want to test whether the capital buffer depends on the business cycle, 
the  set  of  explanatory  variables  includes  a  variable  capturing  the 
macroeconomic  conditions  in  addition  to  bank-specific  variables.  Our 
explanatory variables are as follows: 
·  the  lagged  dependent  variable,  1 , - t i B   to  account  for  a  possible 
autoregressive  behavior  of  capital  buffer  for  instance  due  to  adjustment 
costs of capital. Hence, we expect a positive sign; 
·  the annual return on equity,  it ROE . Considered as a proxy for the cost of 
capital, it is expected to be negatively correlated with capital buffer; 
·  the ratio of total provisions for loan to total loans, Provit, as a proxy for 
the internal measure of risk. The expected sign is ambiguous: it may be 
positive if the decision of a bank to raise capital signals its risk aversion 
and/or  a  better  capacity  to  absorb  losses  in  the  future.  It  may  also  be 
negative if losses reduce the level of capital; 
·  the size of the bank,  it Size , measured by the total assets of a bank minus 
mean total assets of all banks, both being taken in logarithm at the end of 
the year. The ratio of each bank’s assets to the mean total assets is meant to 
avoid spurious correlation stemming from a time trend in banks’ assets. We 
expect a negative sign, as big banks have less incentives to constitute capital 
buffers  due  to  a  lower  risk  aversion,  in  line  with  the  too  big  to  fail 
hypothesis  and  due  to  their  higher  ability  to  diversify  risks  and  access 
funding; 
·  the  output  gap,. t P D G
(
  The  sign  of  the  coefficient  determines  whether 
banks constitute precautionary savings in bad times (if the sign is negative), 
in which case procyclicality may occur or tend to smooth their activities 
across the cycle (if the sign is positive). 
The model to be estimated over a panel of banks is expressed as follows 
(expected signs in brackets):   
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In equation (2), our variable of interest is  t P D G
(
, the other variables stand 
for  control.  We  use  the  Arellano–Bover  (1995)  Generalized  Method  of 
Moments (GMM) estimator to take account of several characteristics of our 
panel: (i) the possible endogeneity of the explanatory variables, especially 
the lagged dependent variable; (ii) the presence of fixed effects possibly 
correlated  with  the  explanatory  variables;  (iii)  the  short  time  dimension 
(T=17)  and  larger  cross-section  dimension  (N  =98);  (iv)  the  possible 
autocorrelation of residuals and heteroskedasticity between banks. As we 
want  to  account  for  a  possible  endogeneity  of  the  ROE,  we  use  as 
instruments for the differenced equation: the second and third lags of the 
dependent variable, the first and second lags of the ROE in level and other 
explanatory variables in difference; for the level equation, the differenced 
dependent variable, the ROE and other explanatory variables in level. The 
choice of lags for the instruments related to the dependent variable is driven 
by  the  need  to  avoid  too  many  instruments  compared  to  the  number  of 
individuals. Our post estimation diagnosis includes a Sargan test to check 
the  validity  of  our  instruments  and  a  m2  test  checking  for  the  non 
autocorrelation of order 2 of the differenced residuals. Both tests validate 
our specification: our instruments are exogenous and not correlated with the 
error term  it e ; and the residuals exhibit the expected characteristics. 12 
Results are presented in Table 2. As far as our variable of interest – the 
output gap – is concerned, we do find a significant and negative coefficient 
(Table  2,  column  1).  This  result  tends  to  attest  that  a  worsening  real 
economy situation is translated into an increase in bank capital buffers that 
can be interpreted as an increase in precautionary reserves in bad times. 
                                                 
12 Results are not reported for the sake of brevity, but are available from the authors upon request.  19 
Note that this effect would pave the way for pro-cyclicality, if more capital 
buffers were to amplify the cyclical slowdown of loan growth. As for the 
control  variables,  the  coefficient  of  the  lagged  buffer  is  positive  with  a 
significance close to the 10% threshold. Its small magnitude (0.16) suggests 
a slight autocorrelation of the total capital buffer’s level. The coefficient of 
the size is significant and has the expected negative sign: large banks hold 
less capital, in line with the too-big-to-fail hypothesis. As regards the other 
two bank-specific variables, namely the return on equity and the ratio of 
provisions,  they  prove  significant  with  signs    suggesting  the  following 
relationships:  a  higher  profitability,  reflecting  a  higher  cost  of  capital,  
weighs on the total capital buffer; a higher loan loss provisions rate reflects 
a more careful behavior of the bank, which  increases  total capital buffers.  
 
[Table 2: Determinants of banks’ capital buffers] 
 
To check for robustness, we carry out several alternative estimations. First, 
as  the  relationship  between  bank’s  capital  buffers,  bank-specific  and 
macroeconomic variables might be stronger for the purest forms of capital, 
we substitute successively the Tier 1 capital buffer,  *
it B , and the core Tier 1, 
*
coreit B ,  for  the  total  capital  buffer  in  equation  (2).  The  aim  is  to  check 
whether the different forms of bank capital react differently to the same set 
of explanatory variables, especially across the cycle. 
*











, the regulatory minimum level for the Tier1 ratio being set 
at  4%  of    RWAs. 
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,  with  a  regulatory 
minimum level for the core Tier1 ratio being set at 2% of RWAs.  
The  estimations  confirm  and  even  reinforce  those  previously  obtained 
concerning a possible procyclicality effect (Table 2, columns 2 and 3). More 
specifically, the higher the quality of capital, the higher the coefficient of 20 
the output gap, still statistically significant. This suggests that the sensitivity 
of highest-quality capital to the business cycle is higher than that of the total 
capital. The autoregressive coefficients of Tier 1 and core Tier 1 buffers are 
greater than that of the lagged total capital buffer, which suggests that banks 
face higher adjustment costs for the purest forms of capital. Moreover, the 
coefficients  on  the  other  bank-specific  variables  except  the  size  are  not 
significant, although of the same sign as for the total capital buffer. The 
coefficient on size proves significantly negative, larger and more significant 
than for the total capital buffer, suggesting that the too-big-to-fail hypothesis 
softens the capital constraints on large banks especially for the Tier 1 and 
core  Tier  1  capital.  Finally,  the  lower  significance  of  the  coefficients 
between the bank-specific and the macroeconomic variables suggests that 
macroeconomic conditions are the main drivers of the level of bank capital 
buffers. 
Second, we restrict our estimations to a sub-sample of credit cooperatives 
and savings banks in order to analyze the effects of the legal form on the 
relationship between macroeconomic conditions and capital buffer (Table 2, 
column 4). As credit cooperatives and savings banks are typically smaller 
than  commercial  banks  and  are  likely  to  have  a  more  limited  access  to 
funding markets, we expect a higher autoregressive coefficient and a higher 
sensitivity to the business cycle.  Indeed, the  autoregressive coefficient is 
larger than in the estimation on the whole panel (Table 2, column 4 versus 
column  1).  The  coefficient  of  the  output  gap  is  of  the  same  order  of 
magnitude, though much more significant. Lastly, the coefficient on the size 
is  significantly  negative,  as  previously.  All  in  all,  the  results  confirm  a 
negative relationship between the output gap and the capital buffer as well 
as  an  autoregressive  behavior  of  the  capital  buffer.  These  results  are 
particularly  large  and  significant  for  the  purest  forms  of  capital  and  for 
cooperative banks.   
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4.2 Loan growth equation 
In a second step, we estimate the relationship between loan growth - at an 
individual bank level - and a set of explanatory variables including bank-
specific and macro variables. All variables are contemporaneous with the 
exception of the lagged dependent variable. They are as follows: 
·  the  lagged  dependent  variable,  meant  to  assess  the  autocorrelation  of 
credit growth; 
·  the bank capital buffer,  it B  which is the key variable in this equation, 
meant to test for procyclicality, as explained below. It also assesses the bank 
capital channel, i.e. the impact of the level of capitalization of a bank on its 
supply of loans, 
·  the ratio of liquidity of the bank,   it Liq  measured by the ratio of liquid 
assets  to  total  assets.  Liquid  assets  are  computed  as  the  sum  of  cash, 
interbank loans and securities held in the trading portfolio and available for 
sales. A positive sign is expected as the literature has recently shown that 
liquidity,  in  addition  to  solvency,  is  an  important  determinant  of  loan 
supply, and that liquidity and solvency have large interactions. However, 
banks  may  prefer  to  hoard  liquidity  during  periods  of  stress  for 
precautionary reasons. In this case, a negative sign is expected; 
·  the  bank’s  size,  it Size ,  as  previously  defined,  used  as  a  proxy  for  the 
magnitude  of  adverse  selection  problems  faced  by  banks  when  raising 
uninsured finance due to information asymmetry, along the lines of Kashyap 
and Stein (1995). The latter found evidence that small banks cut loans by 
more in response to external shocks. The expected sign of this variable is 
thus  positive,  as  the  loan  supply  of  large  banks  is  expected  to  be  more 
insulated from external shocks across the business cycle; 
·  the output gap,  t P D G
(
, for which we expect a positive sign, signaling the 
banks’ risk aversion: banks are thought to increase loans when risks are 
perceived  to  be  weak,  namely  in  an  expansion  and  reduce  them  in 
recessions;  22 
·  the refinancing rate of the central bank,  t r , for which we expect a negative 
sign since this variable represents the cost of bank refinancing.  
Therefore, our model is expressed as follows: 
it u t r t P D G Size it Liq it B it c it c it + + + + + + - D + = D 6 5 4 3 2 1 log 1 0 log b b b b b b b
(
    (3) 
     (+)      (?)         (+)         (+)           (+)          (-) 
where  k b  are parameters to estimate,  0 b  being an intercept and  it u  is the 
residuals.  
Our variable of interest in this estimation is the bank capital buffers. Its sign 
will be decisive for testing the hypothesis of procyclicality. Let’s assume a 
negative shock on the output gap. This would result in an increase in the 
capital  buffers  according  to  our  previous  results  in  Section  4.1.  If  after 
controlling  for  output,  that  increase  in  the  capital  buffers  enhances  loan 
growth  (positive  sign),  lending  behavior  would  act  counter-cyclically, 
mitigating the effects of the initial shock. On the contrary, if that increase in 
capital buffers results in a decrease in loan growth (negative sign), capital 
buffers would amplify the initial shock, paving the way for procyclicality.  
Note that a positive sign is generally reported in the literature on US banks. 
It is interpreted as consistent with the bank capital channel hypothesis: well-
capitalized  banks  should  be  less  constrained  under  stress  conditions  and 
would  not  restrict  the  credit  supply  in  order  to  maintain  lending 
relationships. However, the evidence on the impact of bank capitalization on 
credit growth is somewhat mixed. First, in their seminal paper, Berger and 
Udell  (1994)  find  that  in  the  particular  case  of  commercial  real  estate 
lending and two other credit sub-categories, the decline in growth rates of 
loans for well-capitalized banks was actually larger than for low-capitalized 
banks. This finding is inconsistent with the idea that capital constraints were 
the  main  driver  of  the  credit  crunch  during  the  nineties  and  implies  a 
negative sign for the coefficient of the capital buffer in the credit growth 
equation.  Second,  using  micro-level  data  on  German  banks,  Stolz  and 
Wedow  (2010)  find  that  low-capitalized  banks  actually  do  not  reduce 23 
lending during economic downturns. Again, this behavior contrasts with the 
results commonly reported in the US literature. Finally, anecdotic evidence 
indicates that despite huge injections of public funds in the largest banks 
since the beginning of the current financial crisis, bank loans have dried up 
at a rapid pace in the vast majority of developed countries. Instead of using 
the  public  funds  to  sustain  lending  to  the  real  sector,  the  largest  banks 
decided  to  boost  their  liquidity  buffers  and  capital  ratios  perhaps  in 
anticipation  of  future  losses  on  their  asset  portfolios.  This  behavior  is 
consistent with the results reported by Frame et al. (2009), who fail to find a 
significant effect of the public fund injections on the loan supply of the 
largest US banks. In addition to a statistical assessment of the effect of bank 
capital on lending behavior, we also allow for different measures of capital 
buffer depending on the capital’s quality, namely total capital buffer, Tier 1 
capital buffer and core Tier 1 capital buffer.  
 
We use the same econometric methodology as previously (a dynamic GMM 
model à la Arellano-Bover). As GMM instruments, we chose the dependent 
variable (the second to fourth lags in levels for the difference equation and 
the second and further lags in difference for the level equation) and the 
buffer that we consider endogenous consistently with the results of Section 
4.1 (the first to third lags in levels for the difference equation and the first 
and further lags in difference for the level equation); as standard instruments 
we  rely  on  the  other  explanatory  variables  in  first  difference  for  the 
difference equation. We also perform an AR(2) test and an m2 Sargan test 
which both validate our specification. 
The  main  results  are  presented  in  columns  (1)  to  (3)  of  Table  3.  The 
coefficient on the output gap is significantly positive whatever the measure 
of  capital  buffer  considered:  when  the  output  gap  increases  by  one 24 
percentage point, loan growth increases by about 3 percent. The liquidity 
ratio is not found to have a significant impact on loan growth13.  
More  importantly,  in  contrast  with  the  results  commonly  reported  in  the 
literature concerning US banks including the most recent papers (see e.g. 
Berrospide and Edge, 2010) the coefficient of the buffer is found negative. 
Consequently, when the buffer increases, banks supply less loans, even after 
controlling for the output gap. This result is all the more significant as the 
capital buffer considered is of higher quality, should either the magnitude of 
the coefficient or the statistical significance of the coefficient be considered. 
This result is somewhat conflicting with the functioning of the bank capital 
channel  as  it  has  been  studied  until  now  and  with  the  findings  of  most 
papers on this topic. It is of crucial importance as it signals that an economic 
downturn that would lead banks to increase their buffers (part 4.1) would 
result in a decreasing loan growth even after controlling for macroeconomic 
factors.  From  this  perspective,  capital  buffers  have  a  procyclical  effect. 
Interestingly, if we consider either the effect of the output gap on the capital 
buffers or that of capital buffers on the loan growth, results prove much 
more significant when capital of better quality is looked at. This means that 
the procyclical effect aforementioned is especially true for Tier 1 and core 
Tier 1 capital. This results may signal a specific feature of French banks, 
namely a weak bank capital channel, as stated for instance by Jimborean and 
Mesonnier  (2010).  It  may  also  capture  more  general  features  of  bank 
lending, as it is consistent with some recent theoretical findings.  Indeed, 
Valencia (2010) shows that banks facing higher uncertainty may prefer to 
keep higher capital-to-asset ratios and to deleverage, due to precautionary 
motives  that  are  presumably  much  stronger  during  recessions.  The 
magnitude of those effects is not negligible: for example, an increase in the 
core Tier 1 capital by 1 percentage point (from the lower bound of 2% of 
                                                 
13 However, as a robustness check, we also used an alternative measure of liquidity given by the deposit-to-credit 
ratio. In this case, we find a significant and negative coefficient, which tends to confirm that during recessions 
banks may choose to hoard liquidity for precautionary reasons rather than lending to the private sector. 25 
risk-weighted assets to 3% for instance) would lower loan growth by 5% all 
other variables kept equal.  
We carry out additional estimations to better check the results. First, we 
restrict  our  sample  to  the  1993-2000  period,  i.e.  before  the  euro  cash 
changeover, in order to account for potential structural breaks (as observed 
in Section 3): results remain unchanged as regards our variable of interest 
both in terms of magnitude and significance (Table 3, column 4), though 
lagged  loan  growth  appears  more  important  in  explaining  current  loan 
growth. Likewise, we exclude the 2007-2009 period to check whether our 
results are driven by the effects of the financial crisis and the simultaneous 
implementation of Basel 2: results remain unchanged, which suggests that 
they  are  robust  to  changes  in  the  period  of  observation.  Second,  as  our 
results might also be driven by the behavior of large and risky banks, we 
add  an  interaction  term  between  the  capital  buffer  and  the  loan  loss 
provision  (Table  3,  column  5).  We  do  find  a  negative  and  slightly 
significant coefficient for that variable. This result can be interpreted in the 
following way: riskier banks which exhibit a higher loan loss provisions or 
banks adopting a safer forward-looking behavior do amplify the procyclical 
effect of bank capital buffers.  
 
[Table 3: Estimation of loan growth] 
 
In conclusion, the econometric investigation carried out in Section 4 shows 
that capital buffers amplify the cyclical behavior of loans caused by  the 
output gap. This result is all the more relevant as we focus on the Tier 1 and 
the core Tier 1 capital, that is to say its purest components. In the current 
context of discussions of the future Basel III framework, those results do 
support the view that an efficient macroprudential regulation should aim at 
smoothing credit growth and, having this objective in mind, bank capital is a 
relevant instrument. In that respect, according to our results, regulating the 26 
purest  components  of  capital  is  the  most  efficient  way  to  dampen  the 
procyclicality of banks’ capital buffers.  
 
5.  Granger causality tests 
We now check for the causality between capital buffers and loan growth. 
Should we find that the capital buffers “cause” the credit cycle, this would 
allow us to validate the procyclicality hypothesis.  
5.1 Methodology 
Standard  Granger  causality  tests  are  based  on  time-series  estimations. 
Variable xt is said to “cause” variable yt if the lagged values of xt improve 
the forecast of yt. Under the usual assumptions of stationarity of the series, 
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where ak, βk and m are parameters to estimate, K the optimal number of lags 
in the regression, ut the residual of the equation. The causality test comes 
down to estimate Equation (4), on a given time period of length T, and then 
test  for  the  nullity  of  all  the  coefficients  on  the  lagged  values  of  xt. 
Generally, the estimation is run as a bivariate vector auto-regression (VAR), 
as the two senses of causality  are searched for simultaneously. The null 
hypothesis H0 is that of no causality:  0 : 0 = b H , where β = (β1,.., βK) is the 
vector of the lagged coefficients βk. The nullity of all the coefficients βk is 
tested through a Wald test.  
As  we  deal  with  panel  data  with  a  small  time  dimension  (T=  17  at 
maximum), standard individual tests of H0 are not powerful. Hence, we use 
a panel-causality test proposed by Hurlin (2005, 2008). We will test  for 
causality for each bank individually, running N individual regressions as 
Equation (4). Let us re-write Equation (4) to take into account the cross-
section dimension of the panel:  27 
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where  aki,  βki  and  mi  are  parameters  to  estimate,  allowed  to  be  different 
across individuals, K a given number of lags common to all individuals, and 
uit the residuals of the equation. Following Hurlin (2005), we test for the 
homogeneous non-causality. The null hypothesis is that there does not exist 
any individual causality.   
N i H i ,.., 1 , 0 : 0 = " = b .           (6) 
where  ) ,.., ( 1 iK i i b b b =   is  the  vector  of  the  coefficients  βik  .  Therefore, 
rejecting the null means that there exists at least one individual for which 
there  is  causality.  The  alternative  hypothesis  can  be  specified  as  the 
following:  
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First,  we  calculate  the  individual  Wald  tests  i W   for  0 = i b   in  the  N 











. This statistic  N W  converges towards a c
2 (K), when 
the time dimension of the panel T tends towards infinity, whereas it is not 
appropriate  because  of  its  low  power  for  panels  with  a  small  time 
dimension.  In  the  case  of  small  time  dimension,  Hurlin  (2005,  2008) 
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is shown to follow a normal distribution N(0,1), when the cross-section 
dimension tends to infinity. Monte-Carlo simulations show that the power of 
this test is high even for small panels (Hurlin, 2005); it is close to 1 as soon 
as there are more than 25 individuals in the sample, even for time dimension 
as small as 10.  28 
5.2 Results at the bank level 
We test for Granger-causality between banks’ capital buffers  it B , and the 
loan  growth  it c D   by  implementing  the  panel-causality  test  proposed  by 
Hurlin (2005, 2008) and described in the previous section. The sample is the 
same as in the previous section, composed of 96 banks14 on period 1994-
2009. If the procyclicality hypothesis of capital buffers holds, the causality 
would  run  from  the  capital  buffers  to  the  loan  growth.  In  this  case,  we 
expect the null hypothesis of no causality to be rejected.  
We check that the series are stationary. We test the hypothesis of a unit-root 
by using the standard panel unit root tests: Levin, Lin and Chu (2002); Im, 
Pesaran and Shin (2003) as well as augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-
Perron tests (Table A1 in the Appendix). The results of every test show that 
both series (buffer and loan growth) are stationary.  
The VAR is expressed as follows: 
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When running the individual VARs, we get the same optimal number of 
lags  K=1,  for  all  banks  using  either  the  Akaike  or  Schwarz  criteria. 
Therefore, we fix the common number of lags K to 1.   
Results show that causality runs in both directions over the whole panel 
(Table 4, columns 1 to 2). This finding suggests mutually reinforcing effects 
between the two variables but might result from a common factor, as the 
two variables are affected by the output gap. A look at the coefficients in the 
VAR  confirms  the  negative  relationship  between  the  capital  buffer  and 
credit growth found in our previous GMM estimations. A deeper analysis by 
                                                 
14 Two banks have been removed from the sample because of an insufficient number of data points.   29 
category of banks reveals that, for the largest category of credit institutions, 
namely  mutual  banks,  the  causality  runs  only  from  capital  buffer  to  the 
credit growth, suggesting that lending decisions depend more strongly on 
the  level  of  capital  for  this  category,  for  previously  mentioned  reasons 
(lower size, more limited access to funding and debt markets).  
 
[Table 4:  Granger causality tests on capital buffer and loan growth – panel 
level] 
 
To  check  the  robustness  of  our  results,  we  first  carry  out  the  Granger 
causality tests dropping successively one of the 96 banks (with replacement) 
included  in  the  sample.  This  procedure  reveals  that  the  test  statistics  is 
robust to the exclusion of any bank.  
Second, as we noted in our GMM estimations that the effect of high quality 
capital buffers on loan growth was higher than the effect of low quality 
capital buffer, we re-run Granger causality tests by substituting core Tier 1 
capital  buffer  for  total  capital  buffer  (Table  4,  columns  3  to  4).  Results 
confirm  the  previous  findings  while  being  more  significant,  in  particular 
when splitting the sample into the different categories of credit institutions. 
This  finding  indicates  that  high  quality  capital  level  may  be  a  more 
important driver of banks’ lending decisions than total capital.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
The current financial crisis has revealed an intrinsic feature of the financial 
system that bankers and other market participants, as well as policy makers, 
seem  to  have  forgotten  after  a  long  period  of  unusually  stable 
macroeconomic  conditions,  suggestively  labeled  by  many  “the  great 
moderation.” Namely, banks and other financial intermediaries may act in a 
highly pro-cyclical manner, thereby exacerbating rather than reducing the 
business cycle fluctuations. One source of pro-cyclicality that has been the 30 
focus of intensive debate in the public policy arena since the inception of the 
crisis  is  the  capital  adequacy  regulations.  In  its  official  response  to  the 
financial  crisis,  the  Basel  Committee  emphasizes  that  addressing 
procyclicality should be a key element of a sound macro-prudential policy. 
Particularly, a great importance is attached to the idea that banks should 
build  up  “capital  buffers”  during  expansions  to  better  absorb  the  shocks 
throughout significant sector-wide downturns.  
The present paper contributes to the post-crisis banking literature on the pro-
cyclicality by presenting novel bank-level evidence from France on the two-
way  interplays  between  three  essential  variables  at  the  core  of  the 
amplification  mechanism:  capital  buffers,  credit  growth  and  output.  Our 
empirical approach is based on both panel data econometric estimations and 
Granger causality tests within a unified, integrated, framework. We find that 
French  banks’  capital  buffers,  as  well  as  credit  growth  at  the  individual 
level,  depend  on  the  output  gap  in  a  pro-cyclical  manner.  The  results 
obtained by performing Granger causality tests strengthen the case for the 
importance of a countercyclical policy framework as we find evidence of a 
two-way  causality  between  capital  buffers  and  loan  growth,  pointing  to 
mutually reinforcing mechanisms. 
The focus on a single country, where bank lending is by far the prevailing 
form of external finance, provides a cleaner analytical context in which to 
examine  timely  research  questions  related  to  the  procyclicality  of  bank 
capital. One of the most intriguing results we report is the negative effect of 
the capital buffer on loan growth. This effect, albeit in contrast with the 
results  reported  in  the  empirical  literature,  matches  the  precautionary 
hoarding  of  liquidity  and  massive  deleveraging  observed  since  the 
deepening of the current financial crisis. It is also in line with theoretical 
models such as Valencia (2010). The idea that capital buffers may reduce, 
rather than sustain, the credit supply following a severe recessionary shock 
should  be  further  investigated  in  prospect  of  designing  a  future 
countercyclical capital adequacy framework.  31 
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Table 1a: Descriptive statistics on main bank variables 
 







98  21  61  16 
Observations  1,332  310  804  218 
















































































































































































































Table 1b: Correlation coefficients between the means of the variables  
 
 











Size  Provision ratio  ROE  Liquidity ratio  Loan growth  Output gap   CB’s interest rate 
Total capital 
buffer 
1  0.71  0.51  -0.24  0.32  0.08  0.14  -0.06  -0.02  -0.04 
Tier 1 capital 
buffer 
  1  0.84  -0.34  0.25  0.10  0.12  -0.10  -0.01  -0.15 
Core Tier 1 
capital buffer 
    1  -0.40  0.26  0.02  0.22  -0.12  -0.01  -0.14 
Size        1  -0.08  -0.05  0.07  0.10  -0.02  0.01 
Provision ratio          1  0  0.33  -0.08  0.03  0.04 
ROE            1  -0.09  0.02  0.01  -0.07 
Liquidity ratio              1  0.03  -0.04  0.08 
Loan growth                1  0.05  -0.03 
Output gap                  1  0.47 
CB’s interest rate                    1 39 
Table 2: Determinants of banks’ capital buffers 
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Number of observations    1,228  1,228  1,228  428 
Number of banks    98  98  98  44 
Number of estimated coefficients    6  6  6  6 
Number of instruments    93  93  93  33 
Sargan test (p-value)    0.22  0.23  0.22  0.70 
Autocorrelation test AR(2) (p-value)    0.86  0.25  0.50  0.12 
Note: *** significant at the threshold of 1 %, ** 5%; * 10 %; t-statistics in brackets 
GMM equations estimated as a dynamic panel with orthogonal deviation estimation and White period weights (Arellano-Bover 
2-step). All t-statistics use White period robust standard errors. List of instruments differenced equation: 2nd and 3rdlags of 
buffer, 1st and 2nd lags of ROE in level, other explanatory variables in first difference; level equation: differenced dependent 
variable and ROE and other explanatory variables in level. 
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Table 3: Estimation of loan growth 
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Explanatory variables  Exp.  
sign  
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Number of observations    1,133  1,133  1,133  340  1,133 
Number of banks    98  98  98  91  98 
Number of estimated coefficients    7  7  7  7  8 
Number of instruments    115  115  115  43  115 
Sargan test (p-value)    0.77  0.75  0.81  0.16  0.83 
Autocorrelation test AR(2)    0.78  0.57  0.05  0.13  0.09 
Note: *** significant at the threshold of 1 %, ** 5%; * 10 %; t-statistics in brackets 41 
 




















WHOLE PANEL   
Capital buffer does not Granger cause loan growth  1.88* 
(0.06) 




Loan growth does not Granger cause Capital buffer  2.85*** 
(0.00) 
Loan growth does not Granger cause core Tier1 
capital buffer  
1.81* 
(0.07) 
MUTUAL, SAVINGS BANKS AND CREDIT COOPERATIVES 
Capital buffer does not Granger cause loan growth  1.69* 
(0.09) 




Loan growth does not Granger cause Capital buffer  1.45 
(0.15) 





Capital buffer does not Granger cause loan growth  1.00 
(0.32) 




Loan growth does not Granger cause Capital buffer  2.19** 
(0.03) 





Capital buffer does not Granger cause loan growth  0.26 
(0.79) 




Loan growth does not Granger cause Capital buffer  1.55 
(0.12) 




Note: We reject the null hypothesis at the confidence threshold of  *** 1 %, ** 5%; * 10 %.  











Levin, Lin and Chu 
(t-stat) 
 









H0= common unit 
root 
3) 
H0= individual unit root 
3) 
  stat.   p-value  stat.  p-value   stat.  p-value  stat.  p-value 
Buffer   -6.46  0.00  -4.32  0.00  300.77  0.00  293.33  0.00 
Loan growth  -103.57  0.00  -19.54  0.00  451.05  0.00  488.35  0.00 
Notes:  
1) Lags are selected by Akaike criterion.  
2) The tests include an individual intercept.  
3) The null hypothesis is rejected when p-value < 0.05. 
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